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Abstract 
 This research work investigated the protection of critical infrastructure 
in Nigeria with special attention to electric power infrastructure within Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The study was guided by six research 
questions and the instrument employed for the research was titled ‘Evaluation 
of the Effectiveness of Protection of Critical Infrastructure’ (EEPCI). The 
study was carried out among the consumers of electricity in three of the six 
Area Councils, the security personnel employed to guard as well as the 
workers of the power facilities called Abuja Electricity Distribution Company 
(AEDC) and Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) in the capital territory. 
The entire population of the study was 3,750 and this cut across the strata of 
the stakeholders in power industry. The data gathered were analyzed by the 
use of frequency, percentages and statistical mean distribution technique. 
Findings from the study showed that the existing protection techniques are 
weak, unassertive and the power companies are slow to mitigating effects of 
attacks on their facilities. Based on the findings, the researcher recommended 
that policies and equipment protection strategies be utilized by the power 
companies and the government. The study laid emphasis on establishment of 
community anti-crime group and provision of free toll hotline for emergency 
purposes. Furthermore, the penalty for damages to power facilities was 
recommended to be stiffer and the security should be empowered to excel in 
their profession.  
 
Keywords: Protection; effectiveness, critical infrastructure; evaluation, 
power facilities; Electricity Company 
 
Introduction 
 Effective protection of power infrastructural facilities is panacea to 
nation’s security, economic vitality, public health and safety. The central goal 
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of effective protection of critical infrastructural facilities is therefore to secure, 
prevent, neutralize or mitigate the effects of accidental or deliberate efforts by 
terrorists plan to destroy, incapacitate or exploit the facilities. When these 
infrastructural facilities are safe and effective then development is assured. 
Ola, (2010) was of the opinion that sustainable development is attainable with 
solid infrastructural base. Availability of critical infrastructure for public 
usage is susceptible to natural and man-made attacks. Badiora and Obadiora 
(2011) were of the opinion that deficit in supply of infrastructure is actually 
worsened by man-made activities and there is need to plan for protection.  
 Protection of infrastructure may include building resiliency around the 
facility, installing security systems and initiating counter measures (Janes 
2014). In the global United Nations Development Programmes’ (UNDP) 
Human Development Index ranking (HDI) of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008, the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) ranked Nigeria low because of 
infrastructure deficit. The establishment of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC) was therefore one of the measures to protect critical national 
assets and infrastructure (CNAI) and was supported by NSCDC Act 2003 and 
amended NSCDC Act of 2007. The Act therefore is a confirmation about the 
sincerity and commitment of the Federal Government to protect critical 
national assets and infrastructure (CNAI) in Nigeria. 
 Critical infrastructure on its own may include communications; 
emergency services; energy sector; dams; food; public services; industry; 
health; transport; gas; public communications, radio and television; 
commercial facilities; chemical and nuclear sectors.  
 Many facilities were classified as critical infrastructure by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria through the office of National Security Adviser 
(ONSA) to the President. Going by definition, the word “critical” refers to 
infrastructure which, if disabled or destroyed, would result in catastrophic and 
far reaching damage. According to European Commission, critical 
infrastructure was defined as an “asset or system which is essential for the 
maintenance of vital societal functions”. The Canadian Organization for 
Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) defined critical infrastructure 
protection has cyclical process incorporating prevention, detection, mitigation, 
response and recovery (OECD 2008). According to the ‘Risk Management 
Approach’ of the OECD, the best protection result is gotten when surveillance and 
access management to the facility is adequately implemented. At this juncture, a 
brief mention of the concept of protection involving crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED) has employed in this research should be 
explained. The concept according to (Paulsen & Robinson, 2004) involve 
hardening of critical infrastructure targets, deterrence, punishment of accused 
persons, better illumination and lighting up of targets of vandalism. Similarly, 
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knowing your neighbour and the use of surveillance to protect vulnerable targets 
as suggested by Laurence (2011) was equally applied. 
 The fact that energy sector has domineering influence to upshot the 
deliverables from all other critical infrastructure accounts for it vulnerability; 
and it is important to note that production and supply of electrical energy relies 
on complex system which includes but not limited to gas pipelines, flow 
stations and refineries where Oil and Gas is the source of fuel. When it comes 
to transmission of the generated energy, attention is shifted to electrical energy 
pylons, tower member, Injection stations and substations. 
 Electrical power facility as a critical infrastructure in Nigeria was 
divided into Power Generating, Transmission and Distribution sections. 
Although there are many Steam-Power Generating Stations, Gas-Power 
Generating Stations and Hydro Power Stations, but there exist one 
transmission company known as Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) 
and eleven Power Distribution Companies in the country. All these companies 
are privately owned except the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN). 
 In protecting critical infrastructure, the responsibility for setting goals 
rests primarily with the government, but the implementation of steps to reduce 
the vulnerability of privately owned and corporate assets depends primarily on 
private-sector knowledge and action. 
 
Statement of the problem 
 Electricity is the most vital of the critical infrastructure and key resources 
that support our society. It is the over-all cure for economic helplessness and 
solution to security of businesses, properties, public and private life. Electricity is 
so important but its generation and transmission in Nigeria cannot be guaranteed 
for the fact that it is constantly under attack while its distribution is regularly 
vandalized. By the same token when considering the users’ end, energy theft is 
continuously being witnessed and all these put together give rise to irregular power 
supply, jeopardizing ease of doing business and the concomitant effect is hardship 
and inconveniences to the entire populace. The purpose of this study therefore is 
to investigate the energy sector as a subdivision of critical national assets and 
infrastructure and evaluate how it is being protected in Nigeria.  
 
Specific Objective 
  The significant influence of energy sector on all other sectors makes 
it the most vulnerable subdivision of critical infrastructure, in the light of this, the 
core objective of this study is to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of 
protection of electrical power facilities in Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. 
 
Objectives of the Study 
 The main objectives of the study are examined under the followings: 
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1. To investigate the method of protection being used and the effectiveness 
of the protection technique employed by Electricity Power Company in FCT.  
2. To ascertain the level of support of the host community in protection of 
power facilities within their environment. 
3. To examine the level of commitment of the staff of Electricity Power 
Company toward securing the company’s facilities in FCT. 
4. To discover the effectiveness of the retributive laws and court verdicts 
meant to protect power facilities from vandalism. 
5. To determine the level of preparedness of FCT security personnel in 
mitigating the effects of attacks on power facilities? 
6. To investigate the level of protection against vandalism in government 
owned Transmission Company. 
 
Research Questions 
 The study was guided by the following research questions:  
1. How effective is the protection technique employed to safe guard power 
facilities of the Power Companies in FCT?   
2. Are the community people in FCT willing to support in protecting power 
facilities? 
3. How much support do the staff of electricity Power Company offer to the 
protection of power facilities in FCT? 
4. Are the court verdicts, laws and terms of convictions helpful in curtailing 
attacks on power facilities in FCT?  
5. What is the level of preparedness of security personnel to mitigate the 
effect of attacks on power facilities in FCT? 
6. How effective is the existing vandalism protection technique on the power 
transmission facilities within FCT? 
 
Research Methodology 
 The researcher employed a descriptive research method to analyze and 
solve the research problems (Kothari 2004). The principles of Crime Prevention 
through Environmental Design (CPTED) as suggested by David (2011) was 
adopted and reflected in the composition of the questionnaires. Subheadings under 
research methodology are hereby explained in the order below:  Population of the 
Study, Sampling and Sampling Procedure, and Research Instrument. Others are 
discussed under Findings, Discussions and Recommendations. 
 
Population of the Study 
 The respondents of this study were consumers and power company 
workers from six power distribution Business Areas of coverage, three Injection 
Sub Stations, three Distribution Cash offices, and one Regional office. Others are 
two Private Guard companies and armed security personnel on guard. 
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Sampling and Sampling Procedure 
 Random sampling method was employed in selecting the respondents to 
ease the complexity of dealing with over three thousand participants. For the 
purpose of this study, there were three (3) zones called area councils and from each 
there were five (5) respondents who were randomly selected from the power 
company distribution and transmission offices, ten (10) consumers of electricity 
supply from each area council and ten (10) respondents from security arena were 
selected from each of the three (3) Area Councils identified for this project. The 
gathered data were collated, statistically analyzed and interpreted. 
 
Research Instrument 
 The research instrument used for collection of data in this study was 
‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Protection of Critical Infrastructure’ 
(EEPCI). The research instrument employed was questionnaire having four 
sections ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’. There were fifty (50) numbers of structured 
questionnaires in all the sections. It should be noted that section ‘B’ was 
further divided into parts 1,2,3,4 and 5.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
Research Question One 
 How effective is the protection technique employed to safe guard the 
power facilities of Power Companies in FCT working?   
Table 4.3.1 Responses on protection techniques in FCT 
S/N Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
Yes No % 
Yes 
%No 
1 Is it true that fencing and restricting access 
to power facilities within FCT is protecting 
this equipment?  
48 2 96 4 
2 Do you agree that there exists surveillance 
equipment on power facilities in your area? 
9 41 18 82 
3 Do you agree that there is good illumination 
surrounding power facilities located in your area? 
23 27 46 54 
4 Is it true that armed security personnel are 
on ground to protect power facilities in your 
area?  
9 41 18 82 
5 Do you agree that the electricity power equipment in 
your area is covered by Insurance bond?  
13 36 26 74 
6 Will you agree that there are private vigilante 
security personnel protecting power facilities in your 
area? 
17 33 34 66 
 Aggregate percentage in support 39.67  
Source: Field survey 2018 
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 Using the above table 4.3.1 and the corresponding graphical representation 
below for interpretation, the protection technique pattern showed that fencing and 
access control to power facilities in FCT is reasonably high with 96% but the use 
of surveillance equipment is extremely poor having 18%.  Lighting and 
illumination around power facilities in FCT was found to be poor with 46% while 
the presence of security to guard the equipment is equally low for optimum 
protection. The result equally identified quite low level of private security 
personnel involvement at the community base stations in provision of secondary 
protection around power facilities. Generally therefore, the existing protection 
technique around power facilities in FCT is about 39.67% which is grossly 
inadequate.  
Graph  4.3.1 Responses on protection technique pattern in FCT 
S/N A B % C %    
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Fencing found around many 
power facilities  
96 4 
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Few surveillance Equipment in 
few places 
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Low Insurance cover on power 
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Research Question Two 
 Are the community people in FCT willing to support in protecting power 
facilities?   
Table 4.3.2 Community protection support level in FCT 
S/N       Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
 Yes No % Yes %No 
1 Do you agree that everybody in this area is seriously 
watching to protect the power facility in this area? 
33 17 66 
 34 
2 In this community, do we have private Vigilante group 
protecting the power facilities?   
14 36 28 
 72 
3 Can you support and contribute in paying the vigilante 
protecting power facilities in your community? 
33 16 66 
 34 
4 Do you agree that the jobless in this community are 
willing to be volunteers protecting power facilities? 
25 25 50 
 50 
5 Has this community ever repair and maintain power 
facility on behalf of the Power Company? 
39 11 78 
 22 
6 Will you agree to volunteer information to expose 
security threats to power facilities? 
43 7 86 
 14 
 Aggregate percentage in support 62.33  
Source: Field survey 2018 
 
 From the table values above in 4.3.2, it showed that 66% of the FCT people 
are sensitive to the safety of power facility and equal numbers of people are ready 
to contribute to financing the issue of private security guard on the equipment. Low 
percentage of power consumers up to 28 % are ready to contribute to better the 
functionality of power facilities while many prefer a more serious community 
guard to earn their support. It was equally revealed from the graph 4:3:2 below that 
50% of FCT members supported the idea of employing the jobless in their 
community to guard the vulnerable power facilities. The study showed that 86% 
are prepared to volunteer information to expose security threat to power facilities. 
 Deduction from the above analysis showed that in total the FCT 
community people preparedness to support the protection of power facilities in 
their domain is as high as 62.33%. 
Graph 4.3.2 Community protection support level in FCT 
 S/N A B % C%    
1 
Customers' readiness to guard power 
facilities 
66 34 
   
2 Presence of private security  28 72    
3 Customers' in supporters of private security 66 34    
4 
Engaging the jobless in the community 
policing 
50 50 
   
5 
Community sponsored repairs on power 
facilities  
78 22 
   
6 
Customers' willingness to volunteer 
information. 
86 14 
   
European Scientific Journal April 2018 edition Vol.14, No.11 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
87 
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Research Question Three 
 How much support do the staff of electricity Power Company offer to the 
protection of power facilities in FCT? 
Table 4.3.3 Staff commitment to protection of power facilities in FCT 
S/N       Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
Yes No % Yes %No 
1 Do you agree that security experts of this company has 
robust protection plan against internal and external 
vandalism? 
 
22 
 
25 46.81 53.19 
2 Do you agree that power company staffs’ are 
committed to protect the company facilities? 
21 28 
42.86 57.14 
3 Do you agree that staffs of power companies 
compromise to sabotage and benefit themselves? 
36 13 
73.47 26.53 
4 Do you agree that power facility staff uses substandard 
spare parts to cut corners which endangers protection? 
24 24 
50.00 50.00 
5 Is the power facility endangered when 
Distribution Company demand payment 
for energy it did not evacuate to the 
customers? 
 
33 
 
17 
66.00 34.00 
6 As a staff and a consumer of electricity, would you 
agree that staffs of power companies are faithful 
ambassadors? 
9 40 
22.50 77.50 
 Aggregate percentage in support 50.27  
Source: Field survey 2018 
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 As revealed from the responses in table 4.3.3 and subsequently the 
corresponding graphical representation below, it has been shown that  46.81% 
recorded was an indication that Power Company security experts in FCT do not 
have up to half of what it takes for a robust protection plan against internal and 
external aggressions. There is high value of 73.47% showing the compromise level 
of Power Company staffs and that their commitment to work is 26.53%. 
 The deduction from the above showed that the staffs of electricity Power 
Company can only offer 50.2% to support their employer in protecting power 
facilities. 
Graph 4.3.3 Staff commitment to protection of power facilities in FCT 
S/N A B % C %   
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Research Question Four 
 Are the court verdicts, laws and terms of convictions helpful in curtailing 
attacks on power facilities in FCT? 
Table 4.3.4 Effects of Court verdicts in power facility protection 
S/N       Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
 Yes No % 
Yes 
%No 
1 Do you agree that the existing court verdicts on 
vandalism adequately match the gravity of the crime 
committed? 
17 33  
34.00 
66.00 
2 Do you agree that lack of speedy trial of cases of 
damages to power facilities undermines protection of 
power facilities?  
33 17  
66.00 
34.00 
3 Do you agree that it is always difficult getting high courts 
judges assigned to vandalism cases? 
19 30 38.78 61.22 
4 Do you agree that possession of copper should be 
regarded as criminal offence just to protect copper 
material on power facilities? 
35 15 70.00 30.00 
5 The options of fine on vandalism cases are truly 
meagre; do you agree that this penalty should be 
amended? 
45 5 90.00 10.00 
6 Do you agree that stiffer penalty verdicts can 
discourage further attack on power facilities? 
48 2 96.00 4.00 
 Aggregate percentage in support 60.46  
Source: Field survey 2018 
  
 In the table 4.3.4 as shown above, the low value of 34% indicated level of 
insignificance of court verdicts in curbing damages and vandalism on power 
facilities around FCT Abuja. Many respondents up to 66% were of the opinion 
that accelerated court trial if applied against vandals is a better antidote to 
vandalism on power facilities but the chance of getting high court judge is as slim 
as 38.78%. High percentage of 70% from the respondents agreed with the court to 
criminalize possession of copper material and that option of fine in court cases 
should be made tougher with a vote of 90% if at all it cannot be abrogated. 
 In conclusion, it can be deduced that with the average value of 60.46% for 
existing court verdicts, laws and terms of convictions are achieving the desired 
result of curtailing attacks on power facilities in FCT 
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Graph 4.3.4 Effects of Court verdicts in power facility protection 
S/N A B % C %   
1 
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Research Question Five 
 What is the level of preparedness of security personnel to mitigate the 
effects of attacks on power facilities in FCT? 
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Table 4.3.5 Effects of optimum provision of tools of trade in power facility protections. 
S/N       Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
 Yes No % 
Yes 
%No 
1 Do you think the presence of armed personnel reduces 
attack on power facilities? 
39 11 78.00 22.00 
2 Do you agree that security officers respond fast to 
attacks on power facilities? 
27 23 54.00 46.00 
3 Do you agree that the security personnel on power 
facilities are motivated to excel in their profession? 
11 39 22.44 77.56 
4 Is the government adequately funding security 
personnel to protect power facilities as expected? 
17 32 34.69 65.31 
5 Security officers’ primary duty is to protect, do 
you agree that the Power Company should be 
responsive to officers’ welfare packages? 
45 5 90.00 10.00 
6 Do you agree that power company should provide 
security officer with tools of trade to perform their 
statutory duty? 
41 9 82.00 18.00 
 Aggregate percentage in support 60.19  
Source: Field survey 2018 
 
 The table 4.3.5 above as well as the graphical representation below was 
gotten from power facility protected zone in FCT and it showed a high value of   
78% in favour of reduction of attacks on facilities owing to the presence of security 
personnel. Also 54% showed that security personnel response was slightly above 
average but the low percentage of 22.44% showed that they are not adequately 
motivated to excel in their profession. Similarly the low percentage value of 
34.69% showed that the government funding is far below average. 
 It was observed that many respondents in FCT up to 82% maintained that 
Power companies should be responsive to welfare packages of the security 
personnel on their facility protection.  
 The deduction from above showed that the level of preparedness of 
security personnel to mitigate the effects of attacks on power facilities in FCT is 
about 60.19%. 
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Graph 4.3.5 Effects of optimum provision of tools of trade in power facility protections. 
S/N A B % C %   
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Research Question Six 
 How effective is the existing vandalism protection technique on the power 
transmission network facilities within FCT? 
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Table 4.3.6 Response on protection technique of Transmission Company in FCT 
S/N       Questions Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responses 
 Yes No % 
Yes 
%No 
1 Do you agree that Transmission Company of Nigeria 
(TCN) has a strong protection plan against vandalism? 
17 33 34.00 66.00 
2 Does the TCN engage armed security personnel to 
guard its transmission network? 
38 11 76.00 24.00 
3 Do you know if TCN is involving community people 
in its power protection awareness? 
18 32 36.00 64.00 
4 Do you agree that network surveillance for 
maintenance is protecting the grid? 
21 28 
42.86 57.14 
5 Do you think the management of TCN should 
therefore be responsible for the welfare of armed 
personnel deployed to their network? 
47 3 
94.00 6.00 
6 Do you agree that transmission of power has ever been 
sabotage for political reasons? 
36 14 
73.46 26.54 
 Aggregate percentage in support 59.39  
Source: Field survey 2018 
 
 Using the above table 4.3.6 and the corresponding graphical representation 
below for interpretation therefore, TCN protection strategy scored a low value of 
34% rating despite the fact that the presence of armed personnel is as high as 76% 
on the facilities in FCT. The table equally gives a low value of 36% on the 
involvement of the community people in TCN protection strategy. Similarly a 
slightly below average percentage value of 42.86% on surveillance for 
maintenance was recorded with high level percentage of 73.46% for non-fading 
sabotage. Finally, the high percentage value of 94% is in support of Transmission 
Company to be responsive to security matters.  
 In conclusion, the existing vandalism protection technique on the power 
transmission network facilities within FCT is on the average value of 59.39% but 
not the best for a nation hoping to stabilize energy sector.  
Graph 4.3.6 Response on protection technique of Transmission Company in FCT 
 S/N A B% C%   
1 
TCN protection plan against 
vandalism not robust 
34 66 
  
2 
TCN tipped to be responsible for the 
welfare of armed personnel. 
76 24 
  
3 
High security presence on TCN 
facilities  
36 64 
  
4 
Low public involvement in TCN 
protection plan in FCT 
42.86 57.14 
  
5 
Surveillance for maintenance below 
average 
94 6 
  
6 
High level of sabotage in protection 
plan. 
73.46 26.54 
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Discussion and Implication of Findings 
 This study revealed the presence of modest protection technique around 
power facilities like transformer, transformer substations, distribution network and 
Injection substations in FCT, but proving this inadequacy is beyond the scope of 
this research work. The study also made it known that the FCT community people 
are prepared to support the protection of power facilities in their domain, they are 
fully prepared to mitigate the effects of attacks on power facilities and in support 
of the idea of stiffer court penalties against all forms of damages to power facilities. 
The study further revealed that the existing vandalism protection technique on the 
power transmission network facilities within FCT is meek, unassertive and far 
below average for relying much on government and benevolence of the 
community and little from the company’s staff. In conclusion, if we win in our 
mission to protect power facilities, then our growth will be certain! 
 
Recommendations 
 This research work investigated the effectiveness of protection of critical 
infrastructure in Nigeria; with special reference to the protection of power 
facilities in Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. The study recommended 
equipment/system as well as policy strategic techniques in protection of power 
facilities. The recommended policies on strategy techniques included stiffer 
penalty verdicts with reference to abrogation of option of fines and 
criminalizing the possession of copper material. This is achievable by lobbing 
for amendment of these laws to prevent intentional and accidental damages to 
power facilities in FCT. Other policies under this category are the 
establishment of community anti-crime group (Phillip, Lewis and Todd 2005) 
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and provision of free toll hotline for emergency purposes. The combination of 
government security with community anti-crime group is achievable if 
government and the company can coordinate the relevant stake holders.  
Provision of functional electronic surveillance monitoring gadgets and 
Transformer Risk Management Insurance scheme is another policy strategy 
worthy of consideration. On equipment and system strategy policy, the study 
recommended that high capacity distribution transformers covering larger area 
should be replaced with numerous smaller pole mounted power transformers 
with a view to making vandals’ access to it difficult and also that attacks on 
these transformers would become localized since resulting power outage 
would be limited to a smaller area.  
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